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4. Telephone conversation withAnnetta Moleno, Legislative
assistant, Business and Consumer Affairs Comm., Oregon
House of Representatives (Sept. 11, 1991).
5. OR. CONsT. ART. I, § 8 provides:
No law shall be passed restraining the free expres-
sion of opinion, or restricting the right to speak,
write, or print freely on any subject whatever; but
every person shall be responsible for the abuse of
this right.
6. Oregon v. Jackson, 356 P.2d 495 (Or. 1960), overruled by
Oregon v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9 (Or. 1987).
7. Id. at 503.
8. Oregon v. Childs, 447 P.2d 304 (Or. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 931 (1969).
9. Id. at 308. However, the court acknowledged that it "could
construe the freedom of expression provision of the Oregon
Constitution, Art. I, § 8, as providing greater freedom of expres-
sion than that of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution."
Id.
10. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (applying
national standards to state obscenity prosecutions), overruled
by Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (applying state stand-
ards to state obscenity prosecutions).
11. Act of July 25, 1973, ch. 699, § 4(2), 1973 Or. Laws 1593:
[M]atter is obscene if:
(a) It depicts or describes in a patently offensive
manner sadomasochistic abuse or sexual conduct;
(b) The average person applying contemporary
state standards would find the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex; and
(c) Taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.
12. See, e.g., Film Follies, Inc. v. Haas, 539 P.2d 669, 672 (Or.
Ct. App. 1975), appeal dismissed, 426 U.S. 913 (1976). The
Oregon Court of Appeals held that article I, § 8, of the Oregon
Constitution did not provide broader protection than the First
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Id. See also Oregon v.
Tidyman, 568 P.2d 666, 676 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (ORS § 167.087
held constitutional), Oregon v. Liles, 537 P.2d 1182, 1186 (Or. Ct.
App. 1975); (Oregon laws criminalizing dissemination of obscene
material upheld as following guidelines set forth by the United
States Supreme Court), cert. denied, Liles v. Oregon, 425 U.S.
963 (1976); Oregon v. Grauf, 501 P.2d345,348 (Or. Ct. App. 1972)
(statute criminalizing knowing dissemination of obscene mate-
rial held constitutional).
13. OR. REv. STAT. § 167.087 (1985), which provides in perti-
nent part:
(1) A person commits the crime of disseminating
obscene material if the person knowingly makes,
exhibits, sells, delivers or provides, or offers or
agrees to make, exhibit, sell, deliver or provide, or
has in his possession with intent to exhibit, sell,
deliver or provide any obscene writing, picture,
motion picture, films, slides, drawings or other
visual reproduction.
(2) As used in subsection (1) of this section, matter
is obscene if-
(a) It depicts or describes in a patently offen-
sive manner sadomasochistic abuse or sexual
conduct;
(b) The average person applying contemporary
state standards would find the work, taken as
a whole, appeals to the prurient interest in sex;
and
(c) Taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary,
artistic, political or scientific value.
14. Oregon v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569 (Or. 1982).
15. Id. at 576.
16. Oregon v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 11 (Or. 1987), citing Oregon
v. Robertson, 649 P.2d 569 (Or. 1982).
17. Oregon v. Robertson, 649 P.2d at 576.
18. Oregon v. Henry, 732P.2d at 11.
19. Oregon v. Henry, 717P.2d 189 (Or. Ct. App. 1986), affd,
732P.2d 9 (Or. 1987).
20. Michiganv. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983).
21. Id.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23. OR. CONsr. art. I, § 8.
24. 732 P.2d at 11.
25. OR. CONST. art. I, § 8.
26. 732P.2d at 11.
27. 732 P.2d at 13-14, citing U.S. v. 12,200 Ft. Reels of Film,
413 U.S. 123, 132-133 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 14.
29. Id. at 16.
30. Id.
31. Oregon v. Tidyman, 568 P.2d 666 (Or. Ct. App. 1977).
32. 732 P.2d at 17.
33. Id. at 18. (emphasis added)
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Oregon v. Ray, 733 P.2d 28 (Or. 1987).
37. City of Portland v. Tidyman, 759 P.2d 242 (Or. 1988).
38. 733 P.2d at 31 (Linde, J., concurring).
39.Id.
40. H.B. 2666, § 1, 66th Leg., 1991 Oregon.
41. Id.
42. Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
43. 39 U.S.C. § 3008 (1988).
44. 397 U.S. at 734.
45. Id. at 737.
46. H.B. 2666, § 1, 66th Leg., 1991 Oregon.
47. 732 P.2d at 15.
48. Id. at 16.
49. Id. at 18.
50. 733 P.2d at 31.
51. 397 U.S. at 741 (Brennan, J., concurring).
52. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
53. Oregon v. Frick, 653 P.2d 553 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (distri-
bution of obscene printed material to minors on the grounds that
the statute "proscribes too much insofar as it proscribes the
furnishing of depiction of nudity per se.') Id. at 558.; Oregon v.
Woodcock, 706 P.2d 1012 (Or. Ct. App. 1985), rev. denied 713 P.2d
1059 (Or. 1986) (distribution to minors of printed material which
contained socially unacceptable language no matter how inci-
dental the language is to the work as a whole on the grounds
that the language was unconstitutionally overbroad and not
amenable to a narrowing construction.) Id. at 1013-1014..
54. 653 P.2d at 556.
55. 733 P.2d at 31.
56. H.B. 2666, § 2, 66th Leg., 1991 Oregon.
New York's Sale
of Sculpture Disclosure Law:
Art Merchant Beware
Introduction
On January 1, 1991, significant amendments to
New York's Cultural Affairs Law became effective.1
The amendments, pertaining primarily to Articles
14 and 15 of the law, place various disclosure re-
quirements on art merchants before and during the
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sale of sculpture priced over $1500.2 Legislators,
concerned that the recent popularity of collecting
art for investment purposes exposed new collectors
to exploitive marketing techniques, enacted the
Full Disclosure in Sale of Sculpture Law [hence-
forth "Sculpture Amendment"] to address the sale
of "visual art multiples."' Art multiples refer to
prints, photographs, sculpture, and similar art ob-
jects which are produced in more than one copy;4
for example, sculpture molds which are capable of
casting duplicates of the original work. Art multi-
ples as such possess unique problems for their
creators by expanding or restricting the artist's
control of her work, their purchasers by producing
apparent originals, thereby enhancing deceptive
market practices, and their merchants by exposing
complex selling techniques to an increasingly "mid-
dle class" consumer.
This update traces the legislative history of the law,
and will identify and explain the public policies that
shape it. It will also examine the scope of the law's
provisions, and contain an analysis of the burdens
placed on artists, art merchants, and consumers
alike.
Background of Original
Visual Art Multiples Law
An inquiry into the background of the original
Visual Art Multiples Law provides a useful tool in
understanding the policy behind New York's severe
pruning of the caveat emptor doctrine. The common
law of contract and tort provide some limitation to
the "buyer beware" rule. 5 New York took further
action in 1981 by enacting the Sale of Visual Art in
Multiples statute. The law regulates the sales of
prints, photographs (positive or negative), and
similar art objects produced in more than one copy
by placing disclosure burdens on art merchants by
enacting the Sale of Visual Art Objects Produced in
Multiples statute. The law excluded sculpture.
6
The law requires that all visual art multiples of-
fered for sale "in, into or from" New York state after
January 1, 1982 be accompanied by a "written
instrument" containing details such as the name of
the artist, the year printed, and whether the piece
was approved or authorized by the artist.7 Less
detailed information is required for older multiples,
and art merchants have the opportunity to provide
disclaimers in specific circumstances. 8 However,
any material information supplied on the certifi-
cate (e.g. name of the artist) amounts to an express
warranty as of the date of the sale.
9
The overriding policies of regulating art multiples
were four fold: alleviating confusion; preventing
deceptive merchandising practices; providing a ba-
sis for further consumer self-education; and pro-
tecting the public in areas where abuse is not
immediately detectible.' 0 Hailed as a "giant step
forward" in protecting the consumer and artist
alike, the statute received approval from the legal
community." However, the same legal community
expressed some concern that the statute en-
croached on artistic creativity by burdening the art
community with the expense of maintaining re-
cords and hiring legal advisers to explain the new
law, and introduced alarming levels of government
interference with artistic production. 12
Background of Sculpture
Disclosure Amendment
Many factors contributed to the need for an amend-
ment to the Sale of Visual Art in Multiples law. The
first factor is the increasing popularity of fine art
objects, including sculpture, as investment tools by
a new, relatively unsophisticated, middle-class con-
sumer.3 Second, the influx of new marketing and
reproduction techniques made the reproduction
harder to detect.1 4 Third, the increase in litigation
and media attention to controversies within the art
business brought market abuses to light.15 Finally,
the onslaught of politicization of the art community
caused widespread attention.1 6
To address these concerns, a New York state sena-
tor introduced a bill in 1987 to amend the Arts &
Cultural Affairs Law.' 7 The bill attacked market
abuses and consumer fraud by requiring disclosure
of nine facts for all sculpture when an art merchant
(or art merchant's agent) offers to sell, sells, or
consigns sculpture in, into, or from New York, un-
less accompanied by a certificate of authenticity.1 8
Notably, the disclosure was mandatory during four
time frames: prior to sale or consignment; prior to
placing an order for sculpture, if the purchaser so
requests; when payment is made prior to or at the
time of delivery; and, at an auction or in a catalog
or other written instrument available for consult-
ation before any sale.' 9 The bill also required addi-
tional information for limited edition sculpture,
and provided penalties for unauthorized casts.21
These provisions aimed to protect a broad range of
consumers, as well as artists, by informing prospec-
tive buyers of objective facts of a sculpture before
the purchase is made.22 The bill, however, was
re-committed and revised before it reached its final
form in 1990.? Included was a curious revision of
the sculpture definition clause, discussed below.
Passed by a message of necessity on December 21,
1990, the Sculpture Amendment became law the
first day of 1991.
Fall 1991 15
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Substance of the Sculpture
Amendment
In its amended form, the Sculpture Amendment
brings sculpture within the protective measures of
the Sale of Visual Art Multiples Law, and imposes
unique burdens on foundries not present in the
prior legislation.
Definitions
Sections 1, 2, and 3 of the Sculpture Amendment
(section 11.01 of the Arts & Cult. Aff. Law) contain
relevant statutory definitions.2 Notably, sculpture
is defined as "a three-dimensional fine art object
produced, fabricated or carved in multiple from a
mold, model, cast, form or other prototype, other
than from glass, sold, offered for sale or consigned
in, into or from this state for an amount in excess
of fifteen hundred dollars."2
The deliberate exclusion of glass as a sculptural
medium appears odd at first glance. The fact that
glass is not 'classically' considered a sculptural
medium should have little impact in light of the
public policy's overriding concerns.26 Glass objects
produced in molds can be just as easily duplicated
as their bronze or clay counterparts. Consequently,
middle-class consumers would be as equally vul-
nerable to deception in buying glass "sculpture" as
they would in purchasing non-glass forms. The
inconsistency is due to the lobbying by Steuben
Glass, manufacturers of decorative glass objects
headquartered in New York state.27 Steuben
claimed that the statutory requirements were too
burdensome, and that Steuben's works represented
a caliber '"o one" could replicate.2 Consequently,
the definition places artists, merchants, and buyers
of cast glass sculpture completely outside the pro-
tections of the statute, thereby diminishing the
effectiveness of its policies.
Scope of the Sculpture Amendment
The provisions of the Sculpture Amendment per-
tain to all art merchants causing catalogues, pro-
spectuses, flyers, or other written material or ad-
vertisement to be distributed in, into, or from New
York.29 These written materials must solicit offers
to effect a specific sale.30 If one can so classify the
material in this manner, art merchants must place,
in close physical proximity to the multiple's descrip-
tion, the disclosure information.3 1 In lieu of such
information, the statute provides a message in-
forming prospective purchasers of their right to
disclosure before purchasing. The message is also
to be placed in close physical proximity to the
solicitation. 32 Moreover, art merchants who "regu-
larly engage" in sales of multiples and who do
business in New York must post written, legible
signs in their place of business informing the buyer
that New York law provides for disclosure in the
writing of certain facts.33
Unique to the Sculpture Amendment are the bur-
dens placed on New York foundries. Each piece of
sculpture must possess a clear and distinctive mark
which identifies the foundry or other production
facility at which the sculpture was made, as well as
the year of production.3 4 Moreover, any foundry (or
person) producing such sculpture must prepare and
maintain records containing all the information
required by the law. The records must go back 25
years, at a minimum, and must be available for the
state Attorney General's inspection .3 These two
burdens only apply to sculpture produced after
January 1, 1991.36
Penalty Provisions
The Sculpture Amendment imposes several penal-
ties for violation of its provisions. Among these
penalties are:37 (a) failure of a foundry to affix its
identifyingmark (punishable by a fine not to exceed
$5,000); (b) defacing the identifying mark (fine not
to exceed $5,000);38 (c) failure of a foundry and/or
art merchant to maintain written records (subject
to a maximum $500 punishment pursuant to Art.
22(A) secs. 349, 350 of the General Business Law).39
New York's Penal Law also addresses criminal
sanctions for art fraud where there is an intent to
defraud, coupled with an act of altering or making
an object look antique, rare, or authentic. 4
Impact of the Sculpture
Amendment
The Sculpture Amendment will effect art mer-
chants, foundries, and consumers. Businesses sell-
ing sculpture will have to accommodate the re-
quirements of the new amendment, such as
record-keeping, posting signs, and perhaps a
heightened awareness on the part of art merchants
in tracking down unauthorized copies. Art mer-
chants can be expected to protest the burdens of
maintaining extensive records; indeed, such bur-
dens may deter art merchants from selling art
multiples in New York. Several years ago, when
New York City began enforcing an ordinance re-
quiring the posting of prices in all sales of art works,
art merchants protested vigorously.41 The protests
focused on the sign's psychological barrier inhibit-
ing the viewer from reacting to the art work on its
own merits and a fear that gallery conversation
would turn to "rude" comments on prices.42 To com-
bat these fears, some commentators have devised
"checklists" to simplify the disclosure process. One
commentator, for instance, created a comprehen-
sive checklist after New York enacted its first visual
16 Journal of Art & Entertainment Law
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art multiples law.43 Such a checklist could be easily
adapted for the current Sculpture Law.
The ultimate impact of the Sculpture Amendment
will be on the art-buying public at large, and the
ability of artists to control their creations. One of
the more optimistic goals of the Amendment is to
ignite public awareness that valuation of an art
work depends on more than aesthetic (subjective)
factors. This goal has more relevance, however,
when art is viewed as a "good" investment.
Artists and their estates now will have a better
chance of preventing misrepresentation of their
work during the "sales puffing" stage of a purchase.
On the other hand, artists may view the Sculpture
Amendment as an alarming encroachment by the
state. How comfortable artists feel about this re-
mains to be seen. The impact of the Sculpture
Amendment will be analyzed by the Attorney Gen-
eral on or before January 1, 1993, pursuant to
section 14.08 of the statute.44 At that time, the
ultimate benefits derived from such legislation will
be better understood.
Conclusion
Effective January 1, 1991, NewYork's Full Disclo-
sure in Sale of Sculpture Law will regulate the
relationship between art merchants and consumers
during the sale of sculpture. Art merchants will
possess a significant burden of disclosure in the sale
of sculpture priced over $1500, thus eliminating
any reasonable vestige of the common law caveat
emptor doctrine as it pertains to art sale. Q
Susan L. Troxell
1. N.Y. ARTS & CuLT.AFF. LAw, §§ 14.05, 14.06, 14.07, 14.08,
15.01, 15.10, 15.17 (Consol. 1991).
2.Id.
3. Id. at § 15.01.
4. 1990 N.Y. Laws 940, to be codified at § 11.01-20.
5. See 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER. WILLIS-
TON ON CONTRACTS §§ 1538, 1557 (3rd ed. 1970); 3 ARTHUR L.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 559, 608-611 (1960). Both trea-
tises allow contract rescission when parties to a sale are under a
misconception of a material aspect of the object of sale (e.g.,
identity of artist). Of course, the common law tort of misrepre-
sentation also provides an action for damages when a seller
materially misrepresented or concealed salient facts regarding
an art work. See also Carl D. Lobell, Representing Artists, Collec-
tors and Dealers: Bus. Relationships (Practising Law Inst. 1988).
6. In 1981, the statute was consolidated with New York's
General Business Law Article 12-H.
7. For an excellent summary of the prior law, as well as a
comparison with California legislation, see Susan Hobart, A
Giant Step Forward - New York LeGISLAtion on Sales of Fine Art
Multiples, 7 CoLtM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 261 (1983).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 263. The law also required that "due regard" should
be given to the "terminology used and the meaning accorded such
terminology by the customs and usage of the trade at the time
and in the locality where the sale or exchange took place." N.Y.
ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.01 (Consol. 1991).
10. Hobart, supra note 7, at 271.
ii. Id.
12. Id.
13. The Art World And The Law: Forum Committee On The
Entertainment & Sports Industries, pp. 37-40 (American Bar
Assoc. 1987), (contains 64-87 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. in support of
the Sculpture Amendment). Also of concern was the perception
of New York City as capital of the art market in the Western
Hemisphere, possessing the most prestigious auction houses,
galleries and the most art collectors in the United States. Ger-
stenblith, Picture Imperfect: Attempted Regulation of the Art
Market, 29 WM & MARY L. REV. 501 (1988).
14. Carl D. Lobell, Representing Artists, Collectors and Deal-
ers: Bus. Relationships (Practising Law Inst. 1988).
15. In the past years, litigation between auction houses,
consignors and buyers has gained widespread media attention.
For example, in Cristallina v. Christie, Manson & Woods Int'l, a
New York court held as viable a cause of action against an auction
house for alleged breach of contract, negligence, and breach of
fiduciary duty for withholding information materially affecting
a cosignor's interest. 502 N.Y.S.2d 165 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986).
Another suit occurred in the case of Weisz v. Parke-Bernet Gal-
leries, Inc. Here, the plaintiffs brought a breach of express
warranty action against the gallery. Plaintiffs asserted that the
counterfeits they bought were listed in the gallery's catalogue as
being original works of another artist. 351 N.Y.S.2d 911 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1974).
16. Carl D. Lobell, Representing Artists, Collectors and Deal-
ers: Bus. Relationships (Practising Law Inst. 1988). An example
of the politicization of art exists in the NEA/obscenity controversy
as propounded by politician Jesse Helms.
17. N.Y. Senate Bill 4698-A, introduced April 6, 1987, 1987-
1988 Regular Session.
18. Id. at § 16.03-1. The information, to be provided in writing,
was: artist name; sculpture title; name, if known, of foundry
which (or person who) cast, fabricated or carved the sculpture;
the medium; dimensions of sculpture; year sculpture cast, fabri-
cated or carved; number of sculpture casts; whether artist is
deceased when sculpture produced; and whether sculpture is
authorized by artist or the estate, heir or other legal repre-
sentative.
19. Id. at § 16.01-2.
20. Id. at § 16.03-2. Such information consisted of: (a) whether
and how the sculpture and the edition is numbered; (b) the size
of proposed editions and size of prior editions of same sculpture,
regardless of color or material used; (c) whether additional sculp-
ture casts have been produced in excess of edition's stated size;
and (d) whether artist has stated in writing a limitation on
number of additional sculpture casts to be produced in excess of
the stated edition size.
21. Id. at §§ 16.06, 16.07, 16.09.
22. 64-87 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. (in support of the Sculpture
Amendment), supra note 13.
23. N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 14 (1987) provides for enactment of
a bill when its final printing has been on each legislator's desk
three days prior to passage. The provision also allows passage as
a message of necessity, when the bill need not be on the desks
three days prior, where the governor has certified, under her
hand and the state seal, facts which in her opinion necessitate
immediate vote thereon. N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 14 (1987). See
Joslinv. Regan, 422 N.Y.S.2d 662 (N.Y. 1979).
24. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAw § 11.01 (McKinney 1990).
25. Id. at § 11.01-2(18).
26. The dictionary meaning of sculpture is: (n) the art or
practice of shaping figures or designs in the round or in relief, as
by chiseling marble, modeling clay, or casting in metal; (v) to
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